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INNER-MODEL REFLECTION PRINCIPLES
NEIL BARTON, ANDRE´S EDUARDO CAICEDO, GUNTER FUCHS,
JOEL DAVID HAMKINS, JONAS REITZ, AND RALF SCHINDLER
Abstract. We introduce and consider the inner-model reflection principle,
which asserts that whenever a statement ϕ(a) in the first-order language of
set theory is true in the set-theoretic universe V , then it is also true in a
proper inner model W ( V . A stronger principle, the ground-model reflection
principle, asserts that any such ϕ(a) true in V is also true in some non-trivial
ground model of the universe with respect to set forcing. These principles each
express a form of width reflection in contrast to the usual height reflection of
the Le´vy-Montague reflection theorem. They are each equiconsistent with ZFC
and indeed Π2-conservative over ZFC, being forceable by class forcing while
preserving any desired rank-initial segment of the universe. Furthermore, the
inner-model reflection principle is a consequence of the existence of sufficient
large cardinals, and lightface formulations of the reflection principles follow
from the maximality principle MP and from the inner-model hypothesis IMH.
We also consider some questions concerning the expressibility of the principles.
Contents
1. Introduction 1
2. Forcing inner model reflection 4
3. Large cardinals 5
4. The maximality principle and the inner model hypothesis 11
5. Forcing axioms 13
6. Expressibility of inner model reflection 14
Acknowledgements 15
References 15
1. Introduction
Every set theorist is familiar with the classical Le´vy-Montague reflection prin-
ciple, which explains how truth in the full set-theoretic universe V reflects down
to truth in various rank-initial segments Vθ of the cumulative hierarchy. Thus, the
Le´vy-Montague reflection principle is a form of height-reflection, in that truth in
V is reflected vertically downwards to truth in some Vθ.
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This article grew out of an exchange held by some of the authors on the Mathemat-
ics.StackExchange site in response to an inquiry posted by the first-named author concerning
the nature of width-reflection in comparison to height-reflection [Bar16]. Commentary concerning
this paper can be made at http://jdh.hamkins.org/inner-model-reflection-principles.
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In this brief article, in contrast, we should like to introduce and consider a form
of width-reflection, namely, reflection to non-trivial inner models. Specifically, we
shall consider the following reflection principles.
Definition 1.1.
(1) The inner-model reflection principle asserts that if a statement ϕ(a) in the
first-order language of set theory is true in the set-theoretic universe V , then
there is a proper inner model W , a transitive class model of ZF containing
all ordinals and with a ∈W ( V , in which ϕ(a) is true.
(2) The ground-model reflection principle asserts that if ϕ(a) is true in V , then
there is a non-trivial ground model W ( V with a ∈W and W |= ϕ(a).
(3) Variations of the principles arise by insisting on inner models of a particular
type, such as ground models for a particular type of forcing, or by restricting
the class of parameters or formulas that enter into the schema.
(4) The lightface forms of the principles, in particular, make their assertion
only for sentences, so that if σ is a sentence true in V , then σ is true in
some proper inner model or ground W , respectively.
In item (1), we could equivalently insist that the inner model W satisfies ZFC,
simply by reflecting the conjunction ϕ(a)∧AC instead of merely ϕ(a). For the rest
of this article, therefore, our inner models will satisfy ZFC. In item (2), a ground
model or simply a ground of the universe V is a transitive inner model W |= ZFC
over which the universe V is obtained by set forcing, so that V = W [G] for some
forcing notion P ∈W and some W -generic filter G ⊆ P. The universe V , of course,
is a ground of itself by trivial forcing, but the ground-model reflection principle
seeks grounds W ( V that are properly contained in V .
Aside from the usual height-reflection principles, the closest relatives of the prin-
ciples we are considering are the inner model hypotheses proposed by Friedman
[Fri06]. These meta-principles assert that certain sentences obtainable in outer
models are already satisfied in inner models. Although inner model hypotheses
were one of the original motivators for asking in [Bar16] the question that prompted
this paper, they end up behaving rather differently, with two immediate salient dif-
ferences between them and inner-model reflection principles being that
(1) the inner-model reflection principles make no reference to outer models,
and
(2) the inner models asserted to exist in inner model hypotheses are not nec-
essarily proper.
As we will see, these principles also differ in their expressibility. However, the light-
face version of the inner-model reflection principle is obtainable from the standard
inner model hypothesis, see § 4.
The full inner-model reflection principle is expressible in the second-order lan-
guage of set theory, such as in Go¨del-Bernays GBC set theory, as a schema:
∀a
[
ϕ(a)→ ∃W ( V ϕW (a)
]
,
with a separate statement for each formula ϕ and where the quantifier ∃W ranges
over the inner models of ZFC.
(We add a clarification at the request of a referee. In GBC, choice is usually
formulated as a global principle asserting that there is a class function selecting an
element from every non-empty set. In contrast, it is stated in ZFC as the existence
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of such set functions for each set-sized collection of non-empty sets. Nevertheless,
this difference plays no role here, and even the weakening of GBC that uses the ZFC
version of choice suffices to express the inner-model reflection principle as indicated
above.)
The ground-model reflection principle, in contrast, is expressible as a schema in
the first-order language of set theory. To see this, consider first the ground-model
enumeration theorem of Fuchs-Hamkins-Reitz [FHR15, theorem 12], which asserts
that there is a definable class W ⊆ V × V for which
(i) every section Wr = { x | (r, x) ∈W } is a ground of V by set forcing; and
(ii) every ground arises as such a section Wr.
Thus, the collection of ground models {Wr | r ∈ V } is uniformly definable and
we may quantify over the grounds in a first-order manner by quantifying over the
indices r used to define them. In light of the enumeration theorem, the ground-
model reflection principle is expressed in the first-order language of set theory as
the following schema:
∀a
[
ϕ(a)→ ∃rWr ( V ∧ ϕ
Wr (a)
]
.
We may therefore undertake an analysis of the ground-model reflection principle in
a purely first-order formulation of set theory, such as in ZFC.
Clearly, the ground-model reflection principle strengthens the inner-model reflec-
tion principle, since ground models are inner models. Both principles are obviously
false under the axiom of constructibility V = L, since L has no non-trivial inner
models. Similarly, the ground-model reflection principle is refuted by the ground
axiom, which asserts that there are no non-trivial grounds, see Hamkins [Ham05]
and Reitz [Rei06, Rei07]. In particular, the ground axiom holds in many of the
canonical inner models of large cardinal assumptions, such as the Dodd-Jensen
core model KDJ , the model V = L[µ], and also the Jensen-Steel core model K,
provided that there is no inner model with a Woodin cardinal. The reason is that
these inner models are definable in a way that is generically absolute, see Jensen-
Steel [JS13] and Mitchell [Mit12] (one uses the hypothesis of no inner models with a
Woodin cardinal in the case of K), and so they have no non-trivial ground models.
In the rest of this paper we verify and discuss some other properties of these
principles, and how they can be obtained. § 2 provides a discussion of how the
principles can be forced. In particular we show in theorems 2.1 and 2.2 that both
the lightface and boldface versions of the ground-model reflection principle are ob-
tainable from models of ZFC using forcing constructions. In § 3 we explain how the
principles interact with large cardinal axioms, proving in theorems 3.1 and 3.3 that
the inner-model reflection principle is a consequence of sufficient large cardinals.
We also discuss how these principles behave in many canonical inner models. In
particular, as we shall explain in corollary 3.4 and following remarks, under the right
large cardinal assumption, the core model satisfies the inner-model reflection prin-
ciple, but not the ground-model reflection principle. In contrast to this, in theorem
3.8 we show that fine-structural inner models of sufficiently strong large cardinal
assumptions satisfy the ground-model reflection principle. This is complemented
by theorem 3.9, which shows that the assumption of theorem 3.8 is optimal. In
§ 4 we show how the maximality principle of Stavi-Va¨a¨na¨nen [SV02] and Hamkins
[Ham03] implies the lightface ground-model reflection principle, and how the inner
model hypothesis of [Fri06] implies the lightface inner-model reflection principle.
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Next, § 5 considers the relationship with forcing axioms. We point out that while
the bounded proper forcing axiom is consistent with the failure of inner-model
reflection, the ground-model reflection principle is consistent with several strong
forcing axioms. Finally, in § 6 we discuss limitations concerning the expressibility
of the inner-model reflection principle, and conclude with an open question.
2. Forcing inner model reflection
Let us begin by showing that we may easily force instances of the lightface
reflection principles as follows.
Theorem 2.1. In the forcing extension V [c] arising by forcing to add a Cohen real,
the lightface ground-model reflection principle holds, and indeed, the ground-model
reflection principle holds for assertions with arbitrary parameters from V .
Proof. Suppose that an assertion ϕ(a) is true in V [c], where a ∈ V . By the homo-
geneity of the forcing, it follows that ϕ(a) is forced by every condition, and so it will
be true in V [d], where d is the Cohen real obtained by retaining every other digit
of c and using them to form a new real number. Since V [d] is a proper inner model
and indeed a ground of V [c], it follows that the ground-model reflection principle
holds in V [c] for first-order assertions having parameters in V . 
We could have allowed any parameter a ∈ V [c] for which V [a] ( V [c], since the
quotient forcing is again that of adding a Cohen real. We cannot necessarily allow
c itself as a parameter, since L[c] satisfies the statement V = L[c], using c as a
parameter, but no proper inner model of L[c] satisfies this statement. Meanwhile,
the proof of theorem 2.2 will show that over some models, one can allow even c as
a parameter for the ground-model reflection principle in V [c].
Cohen forcing is hardly unique with the property mentioned in theorem 2.1,
since essentially the same argument works with many other kinds of forcing, such
as random forcing or Cohen forcing at higher cardinals. Indeed, let us now push
the idea a little harder with class forcing so as to achieve the full principle, with
arbitrary parameters, including all the new parameters of the forcing extension.
Theorem 2.2. Every model of ZFC has a class-forcing extension satisfying the
ground-model reflection principle, with arbitrary parameters from the extension.
Proof. By preliminary forcing if necessary, we may assume that GCH holds. Let
P be the proper-class Easton-support product of the forcing posets Add(δ, 1) that
add a Cohen subset to every cardinal δ in some proper class of regular cardinals.
Suppose that G ⊆ P is V -generic, and consider the extension V [G], which is a
model of ZFC. Suppose that V [G] |= ϕ(a) for some first-order assertion ϕ and set
a. So there is some condition p ∈ P forcing ϕ(a˙) for some name a˙ with a˙G = a.
Let δ be a stage of forcing that is larger than the support of p and any condition in
the name a˙, and let G0 be just like G on all coordinates other than δ, except that
on coordinate δ itself, we take only every other digit of the generic subset of δ that
was added, re-indexed so as to make a generic subset of δ. Thus, the filter G0 ⊆ P
is V -generic for this forcing, p ∈ G0 and V [G] = V [G0][g], where g consists of the
information on the complementary digits of the subset of δ. So V [G0] is a proper
inner model of ZFC, and since p ∈ G0 and a˙G0 = a˙G, it follows that V [G0] |= ϕ(a),
fulfilling the desired instance of ground-model reflection. 
INNER-MODEL REFLECTION 5
Corollary 2.3. The inner-model and ground-model reflection principles are each
conservative over ZFC for Π2 assertions about sets. In other words, any Σ2 asser-
tion that is consistent with ZFC is also consistent with ZFC plus the ground-model
reflection principle.
Proof. The point is that the previous argument, by starting the forcing sufficiently
high, shows that any given model of ZFC can be extended to a model of ground-
model reflection while preserving any particular Vθ and therefore the truth of any
particular Σ2 assertion. Thus, any Σ2 assertion that is consistent with ZFC is also
consistent with ground-model reflection and hence also with inner-model reflection.
By contraposition, any Π2 assertion that is provable from ZFC or GBC plus the
inner-model or ground-model reflection principles is provable in ZFC alone. 
The Le´vy-Montague reflection principle produces for every natural number n in
the metatheory a proper class club C(n) of cardinals θ, the Σn-correct cardinals, for
which Vθ ≺Σn V . But this kind of reflection can never hold for inner models:
Observation 2.4. If W is an inner model of ZF and W ≺Σ1 V , then W = V .
Proof. Assume that W is a transitive class model of ZF containing all ordinals and
that W ≺Σ1 V . If W 6= V , then there is some set a in V that is not in W . Let
θ be above the rank of a and let u = (Vθ)
W . So V models “there is a set of rank
less than θ that is not in u.” This is a Σ1 assertion about θ and u, witnessed by
a rank function into θ. But it is not true in W , by the choice of u. So it must be
that W = V . 
So the situation of width reflection is somewhat different in character from that
of height reflection, where we have Hκ ≺Σ1 V for every uncountable cardinal κ and
more generally Vθ ≺Σn V for all cardinals θ in the class club C
(n). Observation 2.4
shows that there is no analogue of this for width reflection.
3. Large cardinals
Next, we point out that the inner-model reflection principle is an outright conse-
quence of sufficient large cardinals. We present several such hypotheses that suffice,
in decreasing order of magnitude. The theorem below discusses measurability.
Theorem 3.1.
(1) If there is a measurable cardinal, then the lightface inner-model reflection
principle holds.
(2) Indeed, if κ is measurable, then the inner-model reflection principle holds
for assertions with parameters in Vκ.
(3) Consequently, if there is a proper class of measurable cardinals, then the
full inner-model reflection principle holds for arbitrary parameters.
Proof. The theorem is easy to prove. Suppose that ϕ(a) is true in V , where the
parameter a is in Vκ for some measurable cardinal κ. Let j : V → M be an
ultrapower embedding by a measure on κ, with critical point κ, into a transitive
class M , which must be a proper inner model, definable from the measure. Since
a ∈ Vκ, below the critical point, it follows that j(a) = a and consequentlyM |= ϕ(a)
by the elementarity of j. So ϕ(a) is true in a proper inner model, thereby witnessing
this instance of the inner-model reflection principle. 
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Using this, we can separate the inner-model reflection principle from the ground-
model reflection principle. They do not coincide.
Corollary 3.2. If ZFC is consistent with a proper class of measurable cardinals,
then there is a model of ZFC in which the inner-model reflection principle holds,
but the ground-model reflection principle fails.
Proof. One can prove this as in corollary 3.4 below, using the fact that the core
model K has no non-trivial grounds; but let us give a forcing proof. If there are
a proper class of measurable cardinals in V , then there is a class-forcing extension
V [G] preserving them, in which every set is coded into the GCH pattern. This idea
was a central theme of [Rei06, Rei07]; but let us sketch the details. After forcing
GCH, if necessary, we perform a lottery iteration, which at the successor of every
measurable cardinal either forces a violation of GCH or performs trivial forcing.
Generically, every set is coded into the resulting pattern. The standard lifting
arguments, such as those in Hamkins [Ham00, Ham], show that all measurable
cardinals are preserved, and so by theorem 3.1 it follows that V [G] satisfies the
inner-model reflection principle. Meanwhile, because every set in V [G] is coded
into the GCH pattern, by placing sets into much larger sets it follows that every
set is coded unboundedly often. Since set forcing preserves the GCH pattern above
the size of the forcing, every ground model has this coding. So V [G] can have no
non-trivial grounds and consequently does not satisfy the ground-model reflection
principle. 
We can improve the large cardinal hypothesis of the preceding results by using
the work of Vickers-Welch [VW01].
Theorem 3.3. If Ord is Ramsey, then the inner-model reflection principle holds.
Proof. Following [VW01, definition 2.2; see also definition 1.1], we say that Ord is
Ramsey if and only if there is an unbounded class I ⊆ Ord of good indiscernibles for
〈V,∈〉. This is a second-order assertion in GBC. One can arrange set models of this
theory with first-order part Vκ, if κ is a Ramsey cardinal, and so the hypothesis “Ord
is Ramsey” is strictly weaker in consistency strength than ZFC plus the existence
of a Ramsey cardinal, which in turn is strictly weaker in consistency strength than
ZFC plus the existence of a measurable cardinal.
Meanwhile, the argument of [VW01, theorem 2.3] shows how to construct from
the class I a transitive classM with a non-trivial elementary embedding j :M → V ,
where the critical point of j can be arranged so as to be any desired element of I.
Note that M ( V in light of the Kunen inconsistency. If ϕ(a) holds in V , then
there is such a j :M → V with critical point above the rank of a and therefore with
a ∈ M and j(a) = a. It follows by elementarity that M |= ϕ(a), thereby fulfilling
the inner-model reflection principle. 
In particular, any statement that is compatible with Ord being Ramsey is also
compatible with the inner-model reflection principle, which makes a contrast to
corollary 2.3. One can use theorem 3.3 to weaken the hypothesis of corollary 3.2 as
follows, where we now use the core model rather than forcing. Note that if “Ord is
Ramsey” holds, then the hypothesis of corollary 3.4 holds in an inner model.
Corollary 3.4. If the core model K exists and satisfies “Ord is Ramsey”, then
K satisfies the inner-model reflection principle, but not the ground-model reflection
principle.
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Proof. If K |= Ord is Ramsey, then it satisfies the inner-model reflection principle
by the previous theorem. And since K is definable in a way that is generically
absolute, it has no non-trivial grounds and therefore cannot satisfy the ground-
model reflection principle. 
We thank Philip Welch for allowing us to include the following observation show-
ing that the assumption above can be further weakened. A large cardinal hypothesis
in the region of long unfoldable cardinals suffices, see Welch [Wel04, definition 1.3].
For the present purpose, consider the following weakening of long unfoldability:
Definition 3.5. A cardinal κ is LU if and only if there is a definable proper inner
model M with Vκ ≺M .
For simplicity, we stated the definition in GBC, using the language of proper
classes. Welch’s definition appears more involved since it is being formalized in
ZFC; the appropriate version here would be the result of taking S = ∅ in [Wel04,
definition 1.3], see [Wel04, fact 1.1].
Theorem 3.6 (Welch). If the class of LU cardinals is Mahlo in V , then the inner-
model reflection principle holds.
“Mahlo” is understood here to mean “definably Mahlo”, that is, the LU cardinals
form a class stationary with respect to all definable class clubs, as in [Wel04, remark
following theorem 1.4].
Proof. Suppose ϕ(a) holds in V . By the Le´vy-Montague reflection principle, there
is a club C of ordinals α such that Vα |= ϕ(a). Since the class of LU cardinals is
Mahlo, there is such a cardinal κ with a ∈ Vκ and Vκ |= ϕ(a). Letting M be as in
definition 3.5 for κ, we have M |= ϕ(a). 
Similarly, corollary 3.4 holds replacing the assertion that K satisfies “Ord is
Ramsey” with the weaker claim that K models “the LU cardinals are Mahlo”.
As shown in [Wel04, theorem 1.4], the assertion that the class of LU cardinals
is Mahlo is strictly weaker in consistency strength than ω2-Π11-Determinacy, an
assumption significantly weaker than “Ord is Ramsey”.
Remark 3.7. As suggested by item (3) of definition 1.1, there are natural hierarchies
of inner-model reflection principles obtained by restricting the complexity of the
statements ϕ under consideration. In particular, let Πn-IMR be the Πn-inner-model
reflection principle, the version where the ϕ are restricted to be Πn. In private
communication, Welch remarked that this is a proper hierarchy in the following
strong sense: (if it exists) there is in K an equivalence for each n between Πn-
IMR and a (somewhat technical) statement concerning the length of the mouse
order and admissibility. In turn, this can be used to show that there is a strictly
increasing sequence of inner models (Wn)n<ω, with Wn the least L[E] model for
which Πn-INR holds (but Πn+1-INR fails).
Since the core model can never satisfy the ground-model reflection principle, it is
thus natural to ask whether any fine-structural extender model can. The following
two theorems provide the precise consistency strength of the existence of such a
model. The first direction builds on the methods of Fuchs-Schindler [FS16].
Theorem 3.8. If L[E] is a minimal iterable extender model with a proper class of
Woodin cardinals, then it satisfies the ground-model reflection principle.
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Proof. The argument uses some techniques from [FS16], adapted to the present
context. One key ingredient is the “δ generator version” of Woodin’s extender
algebra, see Schindler-Steel [SS09, lemma 1.3]. If M is a normally (ω, κ+ + 1)-
iterable premouse and δ is a Woodin cardinal in M, then this forcing notion P =
PM|δ has the property that for every subset A ⊆ κ+ there is a normal non-dropping
iteration tree on M with a last model N such that if π is the iteration embedding,
then A ∩ π(δ) is π(P)-generic over N .
The other key ingredient is the P-construction of [SS09]. IfM is a premouse, δ is
a cutpoint ofM (that is, δ is not overlapped by any extender on the M sequence),
P¯ is a premouse of height δ + ω, δ is a Woodin cardinal in P¯ , P¯|δ is definable in
M|δ, and P¯ [G] = M|(δ + 1) for some G which is generic over P¯ for its version of
the δ generator version of Woodin’s extender algebra, then P(M, P¯, δ) is the result
of the maximal P-construction over P¯ with respect to M, above δ.
Essentially, this construction appends to the extender sequence of P¯ the restric-
tions of the extenders on the extender sequence of M that are indexed beyond δ,
as long as this results in a structure in which δ is still a Woodin cardinal. We will
define P(M, P¯, δ) also in the case that δ is not a cutpoint of M, by letting α be
least such that α ≥ δ, EMα 6= ∅ and κ = crit(E
M
α ) ≤ δ, letting ζ ≤ ht(M) be
maximal such that α ≤ ζ and κ+M|α = κ+M|ζ , and setting
P(M, P¯, δ) = P(ultn(M||ζ, E
M
α ), P¯, δ),
where n is least such that ρn+1(M||ζ) ≤ κ, if such an n exists, and n = 0 otherwise.
See the discussion after the statement of [SS09, lemma 3.21] for details.
An iteration tree T on an extender model W which is definable in L[E] is said
to be guided by P-constructions in L[E] if and only if the branches in T at limit
stages are determined by Q-structures that are pullbacks of Q-structures obtained
in L[E] by maximal P-constructions, see the discussion after [FS16, definition 3.22]
for details.
We modify [FS16, definition 3.25] to say that an extender model W definable in
L[E] is minimal for L[E] if and only if it has a proper class of Woodin cardinals,
and for every δ that is Woodin in W , whenever T ∈ L[E] is a normal iteration tree
on W which is based on W |δ and is guided by P-constructions in L[E] and uses
only extenders indexed above the supremum of the Woodin cardinals of W below
δ, the following holds true:
• if T has limit length, then T lives strictly below δ if and only if
P(L[E],M(T ) + ω, δ(T )),
if defined, is not a proper class, and
• if T has successor length and [0,∞]T does not drop, then
P(L[E],MT∞|i
T
0,∞(δ) + ω, i
T
0,∞(δ)),
if defined, is a proper class.
Here, as in [FS16], given a sound premouse R, by R + ω we denote the premouse
end-extending R and obtained from R by constructing over it one step further.
It follows that L[E] itself is minimal in this sense. For example, if δ, T are
as above, where the length of T is a limit ordinal and T lives strictly below δ,
then if P = P(L[E],M(T ) + ω, δ(T )) were a proper class, it would be an iterable
extender model with a proper class of Woodin cardinals that lies below L[E] in
the canonical pre-well-ordering of iterable extender models. The point is that T
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would be according to the iteration strategy of L[E], and so there would be a cofinal
well-founded branch such that MTb is iterable. But since T lives strictly below δ,
it would follow that πT0,b(δ) > δ(T ), and so δ(T ) would not be Woodin in M
T
b ,
but it is Woodin in P , which implies that P is below L[E]; see the proof of [FS16,
lemma 3.23], which shows that there is no L[E]-based sequence of length 2, in the
terminology introduced there. If the length of T is a limit ordinal and T does not
live strictly below δ, then one can argue as in the proof of [FS16, lemma 3.26] to
show that the relevant P-construction yields a proper class model, and similarly in
the case that T has successor length.
Now, to show that L[E] satisfies the ground-model reflection principle, let ϕ(a)
be a statement true in L[E]. By assumption, there is a δ larger than the rank of
a that is Woodin in L[E]. Let η > δ be a cutpoint of the extender sequence E.
Let E˜ code E as a class of ordinals in some natural way. Form an iteration tree on
L[E] as follows (the construction is much as in the proof of [FS16, lemma 3.29]):
first, hit η many times some total extender on the E-sequence with critical point
greater than the rank of a and indexed below δ but above every Woodin cardinal
less than δ. After that, at successor stages, choose the least total extender in the
current model with an index greater than the supremum of the Woodin cardinals
below the current image δ′ of δ that violates an axiom of the extender algebra with
respect to E˜ ∩ δ′. Since such extenders suffice to witness the Woodinness of δ, one
can work with the version of the extender algebra with this added restriction. If
there is no such extender, or if a limit stage λ is reached such that
P = P(L[E],M(T ↾ λ) + ω, δ(M(T ↾ λ)))
is a proper class, then the construction is complete. Otherwise, as in the proof of
[FS16, lemma 3.29], it follows that P can serve as a Q-structure, and the branch
for T ↾ λ given by the iteration strategy in V can be found inside L[E], allowing us
to extend the iteration tree in this case. Further, as in that proof, it follows that
this process terminates at a limit stage λ = η+L[E] = δ(T ), and
P = P(L[E],M(T ) + ω, δ(T ))
is a proper class, and hence a proper ground of L[E]. The tree T does not have a
cofinal well-founded branch inside L[E], but the modelM(T ) can be formed within
L[E].
Since L[E] is iterable in V , it follows that T has a cofinal well-founded branch
b in V such that MTb is iterable in V . Since η is a cutpoint of E, it follows that it
is a cutpoint of P , and moreover P is iterable above η+L[E]. The coiteration of P
and MTb has to result in a common (proper class) iterate Q. Let π : L[E]→M
T
b ,
σ :MTb → Q and τ : P → Q be the iteration embeddings. Note that a is not moved
by π. Since the coiteration between MTb and P is above η
+L[E], a is not moved by
σ or τ either. Hence, we get:
L[E] |= ϕ(a)⇐⇒ Q |= ϕ(σ(π(a)))⇐⇒ Q |= ϕ(τ(a))⇐⇒ P |= ϕ(a).
Thus, P is a non-trivial ground of L[E] which reflects the truth of ϕ(a), as desired.

It was noted earlier that the ground axiom, stating that there is no proper
ground, implies the failure of the ground-model reflection principle. There is a
natural way of relativizing the ground axiom to an arbitrary set a, thus weakening
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it: let us say that the ground axiom holds relative to a if and only if there is no
proper ground containing a. Thus, the usual ground axiom is the ground axiom
relative to ∅. Clearly, if there is an a such that the ground axiom holds relative
to a, then ground-model reflection fails, since there is then no non-trivial ground
reflecting the statement “a = a”. The following theorem shows that a sufficiently
iterable L[E] model that is below a proper class of Woodin cardinals satisfies the
ground axiom relative to some set, and hence fails to satisfy the ground-model
reflection principle.
Theorem 3.9. Let L[E] be an extender model that is fully iterable in every set
generic extension of V and that is below a proper class of Woodin cardinals, in
the sense that its Woodin cardinals are bounded and no initial segment of L[E] is
a sharp for an inner model with a proper class of Woodin cardinals. Under these
assumptions, L[E] satisfies the ground axiom relative to some set x ∈ L[E].
Proof. Let L[E] be as described, and let α be the supremum of its Woodin cardinals.
By [SS09, theorem 0.2], there is a β ≥ α which is a cutpoint of L[E] and such that
L[E] has an iteration strategy for iteration trees on L[E] that only use extenders
whose critical points are above β. By our assumption that L[E] is fully iterable
in every set-generic forcing extension of V , the argument of the proof of [SS09,
theorem 0.2] generalizes to show that there is a β as above such that every set-
generic forcing extension of L[E] has an iteration strategy for iteration trees on
L[E] which only use extenders with critical points above β. We claim that L[E]
satisfies the ground axiom relative to x = L[E]|β.
To see this, let W be a ground of L[E] with x ∈ W . We must show that
W is the trivial ground, that is, that W = L[E]. Let P ∈ W be a notion of
forcing, and let g ⊆ P be generic over W such that W [g] = L[E]. Let γ be the
cardinality of P in L[E], and let h be Col(ω, γ)-generic over V . By the absorption
property of the collapse, there is then an h′ ⊆ Col(ω, γ) generic over L[E] such that
L[E][h] = W [g][h] = W [h′]. It follows that L[E] is a definable class in W [h′] and
is fully iterable there with respect to iteration trees that live above β. In fact, E
(and hence L[E]) is definable in L[E][h] =W [h′] by a formula ϕ using a parameter
z ∈ L[E]. This is because L[E] is a ground of W [h′], and is hence definable in
W [h′] using a parameter from L[E] (namely the power set P(Col(ω, γ))L[E]; see
the discussion of the ground-model reflection principle in the introduction, and
[FHR15, theorem 5]).
Further, E is definable inside L[E], using the argument of the proof of Schlutzen-
berg [Sch14, theorem 4.3]—since we only have self-iterability above β, we start the
inductive definition with E ↾ β, and get a definition of E using E ↾ β as a param-
eter. Combining these two parameters P(Col(ω, γ))L[E] and E ↾ β we obtain the
parameter z indicated above.
Now, z = τh
′
for some Col(ω, γ)-name τ ∈ W . Let p ∈ h′ be a condition that
forces over W that ϕ(−, τ) defines a universal extender model that is fully iterable
above the cutpoint β and that agrees with L[E] up to β. Inside W [h′], for any
q ∈ Col(ω, γ) extending p, let h′q be the finite variant of h
′ compatible with q, that
is, viewing h′ as a function from ω to γ, h′q = q ∪ h
′ ↾ (ω r dom(q)). Still working
inside W [h′], for q as above, let L[Eq] be the inner model defined by ϕ(−, τ
h′
q ).
All these models L[Eq] are universal, iterable above β, coincide up to β, and β
is a cutpoint for each of them. Thus, they can all can be simultaneously coiterated
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inside W [h′], yielding a common iterate, which we denote L[F ]. This is a definable
extender model in W [h′]. But note that L[F ] is definable in W from p and τ , since
its definition does not depend on h′, but only on the collection of all finite variants
of h′. In more detail, view F as a class of ordinals (this is no problem, as L[F ] has
a canonical well-order). We claim that F is definable in W as the class of ordinals
ξ such that p forces “ξ ∈ F” (note that this statement uses the parameters p and
τ). To see this, let h′′ be Col(ω, γ)-generic over W with p ∈ h′′, let ξ be given, and
suppose that ξ ∈ F = FW [h
′], say. If ξ /∈ FW [h
′′], then there is a condition q ∈ h′′
that forces “ξ /∈ F”. Since p ∈ h′′, we may assume that q ≤ p. But then, since
q ∈ h′q, it follows that ξ /∈ F
W [h′
q
], which is absurd since W [h′q] = W [h
′], as h′q is
just a finite variant of h′.
One can now argue as in the proof of Sargsyan-Schindler [SS18, theorem 2.14]:
in W [h′], the iteration embedding j : L[E] → L[F ] is a definable class, and since
W [h′] is a set-generic forcing extension of W , it follows that there is a thick class
Γ definable in W and consisting of ordinal fixed points of j such that L[E] is
isomorphic to the hull in L[F ] of Γ∪L[E]|β. Since Γ and L[F ] are definable in W ,
so is this hull. Hence, L[E], the Mostowski collapse of this hull, is a class in W ,
and therefore L[E] ⊆W . Thus, W = L[E], as was to be shown. 
Thus, the consistency strength of the ground-model reflection principle, which is
the same as that of ZFC, increases dramatically if it is relativized to a sufficiently
iterable L[E] model. This is in line with our earlier results that the core model K
cannot satisfy this principle, and supports the view that ground-model reflection is
in a sense an “anti-canonical inner model” statement. There are several well-known
instances of this phenomenon: for example, the statement (A) that every projec-
tive set of reals is Lebesgue-measurable has consistency strength an inaccessible
cardinal, but does not hold in a canonical inner model at a low level, where there
are easily definable well-orderings of the reals. In fact, if (A) holds in an iterable
L[E] model M , then for every n < ω and every real x in M , M ♯n(x) must be in M .
Another example is the statement (B) that there is no definable well-ordering of
the reals in L(R). The consistency strength of (B) is just that of ZFC, but by a
result of Steel, the least iterable L[E] model that satisfies (B) must be above Mω
(the least L[E] model with infinitely many Woodin cardinals) in the mouse order,
see the remark following the statement of [SS09, theorem 0.2].
4. The maximality principle and the inner model hypothesis
Consider next the maximality principle of [SV02] and [Ham03], which asserts
that whenever a statement is forceably necessary, which is to say that it is forceable
in such a way that it remains true in all further extensions, then it is already true.
This is expressible in modal terms by the schema ϕ→ ϕ, the principal axiom of
the modal theory S5, where the modal operators are interpreted so that ψ means
that ψ is true in some set-forcing extension and ψ means that ψ is true in all
set-forcing extensions.
Theorem 4.1. The maximality principle implies the lightface ground-model reflec-
tion principle.
Proof. Suppose that a sentence σ is true in V . Consider the statement, “σ is true
in some non-trivial ground.” In light of the ground-model enumeration theorem,
this supplementary statement is expressible in the first-order language of set theory.
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Furthermore, it becomes true in any non-trivial forcing extension V [G], since V is
a non-trivial ground of V [G], and the statement remains true in any further forcing
extension. Thus, the supplementary statement is forceably necessary in V , and
therefore by the maximality principle it must already be true in V . So there must
be a non-trivial ground model W ( V in which σ is true. 
The same argument works with the various other versions of the maximality prin-
ciple, such as MPΓ(X), where only forcing notions in a class Γ are considered and
statements with parameters from X . The same argument as in theorem 4.1 shows
that MPΓ(X) implies the Γ-ground model reflection principle with parameters from
X .
A similar argument can be made from the inner-model hypothesis IMH, which
is the schema of assertions made for each sentence σ, that if there is an outer
model with an inner model of σ, then there is already an inner model of σ without
first moving to the outer model. This principle also can be described in modal
vocabulary as the schema of assertions σ → σ, where the up-modality refers
here to possibility in outer models and the down-modality refers to possibility in
inner models. See [Fri06] for details about IMH; the axiom is naturally formalized
in a multiverse context of possible outer models, although Antos-Barton-Friedman
[ABF] shows that modified versions of the axiom are expressible in the second-order
language of set theory in models of a variant of GBC+Σ11-comprehension, without
direct reference to outer models. In formulating IMH, one may equivalently insist
on proper inner models.
Theorem 4.2. The inner-model hypothesis implies the lightface inner-model re-
flection principle.
Proof. If σ is true in V then, in any non-trivial extension of V , there is a proper
inner model in which σ holds, namely V itself. So if the inner-model hypothesis
holds, then there must already be such an inner model of V , and so the lightface
inner-model reflection principle holds. 
Let us now consider the downward-directed version of the maximality principle
studied in Hamkins-Lo¨we [HL13], which can be viewed itself as a kind of reflection
principle. Namely, let us say that the ground-model maximality principle holds if
and only if any statement σ that holds in some ground model and all grounds of
that ground, is true in V . This is expressible as σ → σ, where and are the
modal operators of “true in some ground model” and “true in all ground models,”
respectively.1
By considering ¬σ and the contrapositive, the ground-model maximality princi-
ple is easily seen to be equivalent to the following assertion: if a sentence σ is true,
then every ground model has itself a ground in which σ is true. This formulation of
the maximality principle reveals it to be a particularly strong reflection principle,
when combined with the assertion that indeed there are non-trivial grounds.
1In light of the downward orientation of this axiom, however, the ‘maximality’ terminology may
be distracting, as any deeper ground, for example, will also satisfy the ground-model maximality
principle. What is being maximized here is not the model, but the collection of truths that are
downward-necessary. The principle is related to S5 for grounds, as in [HL13], since the axiom
ϕ→ ϕ is the defining axiom of S5 over S4; but the ground-model maximality principle is not
identical to the validity of S5, as the principle is (trivially) true under the ground axiom, whereas
the modal logic of grounds in this situation strictly exceeds S5.
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Theorem 4.3. If Vδ ≺ V , then V has a ground model W that satisfies the ground-
model maximality principle for assertions allowing parameters of rank less than δ
in W .
Proof. The proof uses the recent result of Usuba [Usu17] showing that the strong
downward-directed grounds hypothesis (DDG) holds; that is, for any set I, there
is a ground W contained in
⋂
r∈IWr , where Wr denotes the r
th ground as in the
statement of the ground-model enumeration theorem.
Assume Vδ ≺ V . By the strong DDG, there is a ground W with W ⊆Wr for all
r ∈ Vδ. Suppose thatW |= ϕ(a) for some a ∈ Vδ∩W . SoW has a ground model
U such that U |= ϕ(a); that is, U satisfies ϕ(a) and so does every ground of U .
Since U is a ground ofW , which is a ground of V , it follows that U is a ground of V
and consequently U = Wr for some r by the ground-model enumeration theorem.
The least rank of an r whose corresponding ground Wr has the properties of U
that we have mentioned is definable in V using a as a parameter, and consequently
there is such an r already in Vδ. In this case, W ⊆ U = Wr by the assumption on
W . Since W ⊆ U ⊆ V , whereW is a ground of V , it follows from the intermediate-
model theorem (see [FHR15, fact 11] or Jech [Jec03, corollary 15.43]) that W is
also a ground of U where ϕ(a) holds, and so ϕ(a) is true in W , as desired. 
The previous argument, using the strong DDG, provides a more direct method
than [HL13, theorem 8] of finding a model of the ground-model maximality princi-
ple.
Corollary 4.4. If Vδ ≺ V and V has no bedrock, that is, no minimal ground, then
there is a ground model W satisfying the ground-model maximality principle and
the ground-model reflection principle for assertions using parameters of rank less
than δ.
Proof. Assume Vδ ≺ V and V has no bedrock. Let W be the ground model iden-
tified in theorem 4.3, which satisfies the ground-model maximality principle for
assertions with parameters of rank less than δ in W . Since there is no minimal
ground, it follows that W also has no minimal ground. By the ground-model max-
imality principle, every statement ϕ(a) true in W with a ∈ Vδ ∩W is true densely
often in the grounds of W , that is, true in some deeper ground of any given ground
ofW . Since there are such proper grounds ofW , it follows that any such statement
ϕ(a) is true in some proper ground of W , and so W satisfies the ground-model
reflection principle for these assertions. 
5. Forcing axioms
Let us consider next the question of whether strong forcing axioms might settle
the inner-model or ground-model reflection principles. Work of Caicedo-Velicˇkovic´
[CV06, corollary 2] shows that it is relatively consistent with the bounded proper
forcing axiom BPFA that the universe is a minimal model of BPFA, that is, that
the universe satisfies BPFA, but has no proper inner model satisfying BPFA. In this
situation, of course, the inner-model reflection principle must fail, and so it seems
natural to inquire whether PFA or MM might outright refute the ground-model
reflection principle. The next theorem shows, however, that this is not the case.
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Theorem 5.1. The proper forcing axiom PFA, as well as Martin’s Maximum MM,
if consistent, are consistent with the ground-model reflection principle, as well as
with its failure.
Proof. We use the fact that both PFA and MM are necessarily indestructible by
<ω2-directed closed forcing, see Larson [Lar00, theorem 4.3]. Let P be the Easton-
support class product used in the proof of theorem 2.2, but with non-trivial forcing
factors only at stages ω2 and above. This forcing is consequently ω2-directed closed,
and therefore preserves PFA and MM, if these forcing axioms should hold in the
ground. The proof of theorem 2.2 then shows that the extension satisfies the ground-
model reflection principle, as desired.
Meanwhile, if (after suitable preparatory forcing coding sets into the GCH pat-
tern) one should use an Easton-support iteration, rather than a product, then again
the forcing is ω2-directed closed, and the main result of Hamkins-Reitz-Woodin
[HRW08] shows that the extension satisfies the ground axiom: it has no non-trivial
ground models for set forcing. Thus, the ground-model reflection principle fails in
this extension. 
6. Expressibility of inner model reflection
Lastly, let us consider the question of whether the inner-model reflection principle
might be expressible in the first-order language of set theory, or whether, as we
expect, it is a fundamentally second-order assertion. The ground-model reflection
principle, as we have pointed out, is expressible as a schema in the first-order
language of set theory. But the same does not seem to be true for the inner-model
reflection principle, in light of the quantification over inner models. How can we
prove that indeed there is no first-order means of expressing the principle?
As a step towards this, let us first show that the existence of an inner model
satisfying a given sentence σ is not necessarily first-order expressible.
Denote by (m) the following consistency assumption, expressed in the language
of proper classes:
V = L + “there is a truth-predicate TrL for truth in L.”
The m stands for mild. Note that TrL is a non-definable class, which satisfies
the Tarskian recursion for the definition of satisfaction for first-order truth. The
consistency strength of (m) is strictly smaller than that of Kelly-Morse set theory,
which is itself strictly weaker than ZFC plus the existence of an inaccessible cardinal,
since KM implies the existence of such a truth predicate. So (m) is indeed a mild
consistency assumption. See Gitman-Hamkins-Holy-Schlicht-Williams [GHH+] for
further discussion of truth predicates and the strength of this hypothesis in the
hierarchy between GBC and KM.
Theorem 6.1. Assuming (m), it is consistent that there are models 〈M,∈, S0〉
and 〈M,∈, S1〉 of GBC set theory with the same first-order part M and a particular
first-order sentence σ, such that S1 has a proper inner model of M satisfying σ, but
S0 does not.
Proof. In L, let P be the Easton-support product that adds a Cohen subset via
Add(δ, 1) for every regular cardinal δ. Suppose G ⊆ P is L-generic, and consider
L[G]. Let S0 consist of the classes that are definable in the structure 〈L[G],∈, G〉,
and let S1 be the classes definable in
〈
L[G],∈, G,TrL
〉
, where we also add the truth
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predicate. (A similar argument is made in Hamkins-Reitz [HR].) Note that in light
of the definability of the forcing relation for this forcing, it follows that S1 includes
a truth predicate for the extension L[G].
Both models 〈L[G],∈, S0〉 and 〈L[G],∈, S1〉 satisfy GBC. Inside the latter model,
let T be a class of regular cardinals that codes the information of the truth predicate
TrL in some canonical and sufficiently absolute manner, such as by including ℵLα+1
in T exactly when α codes a formula-parameter pair ϕ[~a] that is declared true by
TrL. Let GT be the restriction of the generic filter G to include the Cohen sets only
on the cardinals in T . It is not difficult to see that in L[GT ], the cardinals that
have L-generic Cohen subsets of a regular cardinal δ are precisely the cardinals in T .
Therefore, the model L[GT ] satisfies the assertion that “the class of regular cardinals
δ for which there is an L-generic Cohen subset of δ codes a truth-predicate for truth
in L.” So S1 has an inner model, namely L[GT ], that satisfies this statement. But S0
can have no such inner model, since there can be no truth predicate for L definable
in 〈L[G],∈, G〉, as in this case we could use the definable forcing relation and thereby
define a truth predicate for the full structure 〈L[G],∈, G〉 itself, contrary to Tarski’s
theorem. 
In order to show that the inner-model reflection principle is not first-order ex-
pressible, however, one would need much more than this. It would suffice to exhibit
a positive instance of the following:
Question 6.2. Are there two models of GBC with the same first-order part, such
that one of them is a model of the inner-model reflection principle and the other is
not?
In particular, for this to happen we would at the very least need to strengthen
theorem 6.1 by producing a model 〈M,∈, S〉 |= GBC and a sentence σ that is true
in M and also true in some inner model W (M in S, but which is not true in any
proper inner model of M that is first-order definable in M allowing set parameters.
We are unsure how to arrange even this much.
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